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1 Introduction
Following the Lund Commission in 1996, the state maintenance grant was
phased out for 400 000 beneficiaries, and South Africa’s child support grant was
introduced, with the goal of removing racial and gender inequality in the social
support system, effectively targeting poor children no matter their household
status, improving nutrition in the critical early years, and being able to scale
relatively easily to large numbers of recipients (Lund 2008), unlike conditional
cash transfer programs.
Rollout began in April 1998, with various conditions, and by 2000 the grant
was effectively being distributed for children below the age of 7, subject to a
means test, of 800 rand in urban areas, and 1100 rand in rural areas. However
initial take-up was low, estimated at only ten percent in 2000, but increasing to
63% by 2005 (Samson et al. 2008).
The grant is distributed to the child’s primary caregiver, and is intended
to follow the child. It is paid out into bank accounts, at post offices, super
markets, and CPS pay points. In early 2003 7 and 8 year olds gained access,
the following year 9 and 10 year olds, and in 2005 those under 14. Meanwhile
the means test remained unchanged, and thus many would be recipients may
have lost the grant, or never applied for it, due to inflation. Budlender, Rosa &
Hall (2005) calculate that in 2004, to keep pace with inflation, the means test
should have been set 1123 and 1544 rand.
In October 2008 the means test was changed to reflect the effect of inflation,
with the new rule setting level at ten times the level of the grant, thus increasing
the number of would be recipients. In February 2010 it was announced that all
children under the age of 18 would gain access, conditional on the means test.
The value of the grant in October 2008 was 220 rand, approximately 30 US
dollars (Delany et al. 2008).
The CSG may have many positive impacts. It may help to ensure food
security, aid parents in buying school uniforms and paying school fees, and
thus support enrollment and attendance, increase access to credit by raising
individual’s trustworthiness, alleviate poverty in the household, raise women’s
bargaining power in the household, and possibly fund job search and or day care
or creche for the beneficiary, enabling the mother to work.
This paper investigates this last possibility, that of the effect of the child
support grant on a mother’s labour market status. Does labour force partic-
ipation or labour supply change in response to grant receipt? Answering this
question is complicated, due to the endogeneity of the child support grant vari-
able, and whether recipients view access as temporary or permanent. Receipt is
correlated with income, education, and race, amongst other factors. Few papers
have addressed this endogeneity problem satisfactorily, as it is hard to find a
sample in which CSG can be considered to be randomly assigned.
In addition, there is little in the literature regarding the effect of the child
support grant on the mothers of beneficiaries. We consider three outcomes
initially: labour force participant, employment probability, and unemployment
(conditional on being a participant). It is difficult to find good child outcomes
which are not correlated with age and which are recorded in the data, and a
rich literature surrounding the effects on beneficiaries already exists.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides detail of the history of
the rollout of the child support grant. Section 3 discusses the current literature
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around grant receipt in the South African context. Section 4 sets up a simple
static model of labour supply with transaction costs to explain how the CSG
might affect labour market status. Section 5 describes the data used, the vari-
ous sample definitions, and estimation issues. Section 6 examines the patterns
present in the South African labour market over the past 12 years, through the
use of graphs. In Section 7, the various strategies used for identification, and
their motivations are covered, as well as estimation results. Section 8 discussed,
and section 9 concludes.
2 The Child Support Grant: History of Alloca-
tion
In table A11, the amounts, dates of change, and age cut-off values are shown for
the old age and disability grant, the foster care and state maintenance grant, and
the child support grant. This data is collated from SOCDEV data. The Child
Support Grant was introduced in 1998 to all children under 7. The grant was
set at R100 per child, with a means test of R800 in urban areas, and R1100 in
rural/informal areas. The means test included the income ofthe child’s caregiver
and their spouse. The grant was extended in 2003 to 7 and 8 year olds, and
increased to R160. In 2004, it was again extended to 9 and 10 year olds, and
increased by R10 to R170.
In 2005, the age eligibility cutoff was raised to 14, and the grant increased to
R180. In 2008 14 year olds obtained access to the grant, set at a level of R210.
For the first ten years since inception, the means test was kept the same, which
meant that due to creeping inflation, many families may have gradually lost
access to the grant, and the grant may have been less meaningful in monetary
terms. The means test was finally changed in October 2008 to be ten times the
grant amount. 2010 saw a final extension to all children under the age of 18,
and an increase to R250.
A note on terminology. We refer to the child who is designated to benefit
from the grant as the beneficiary, and the mother or other caregiver who receives
the grant, as the recipient.
3 Literature Review
3.1 Existing Literature on Grant Takeup and Effects
Initially many infrastructure problems plagued the rollout of the grant (Hunter
2004, Hunter & Adato 2007b, Budlender et al. 2005, Aguero et al. 2009, Goudge
et al. 2009, Delany et al. 2008). Welfare offices in 2003 were understaffed, and
lacking vital equipment. The system of grant application differed from office
to office. A lack of postal addresses among potential recipients complicated
initial applications. Multiple applications per child were also a problem (Hunter
2004). Knowledge was widespread regarding the grant’s existence, but the exact
details of how to apply, and who could apply were not widely known (Hunter
& Adato 2007a). However, rejections based on the means test were very rare.
Knowledge of the correct age cut-offs in 2003 and 2004 were not accurate (Hunter
& Adato 2007b).
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Many cite lack of documentation as the reason for refusal of their application,
or for not applying (Goudge et al. 2009, Leibbrandt et al. 2010, Woolard et al.
2009, Delany et al. 2008). The time cost of acquiring the necessary documents
was estimated at 8 full hours (Budlender et al. 2005). In 2003, the time to
obtain the grant was 3 or more months. Receiving the grant also took many
hours spent in queues at paypoints (Hunter 2004).
The number of children eligible, and takeup rates, are also discussed. Using
2004 KIDS data, Budlender et al. (2005) estimates that two thirds of age eligible
children are also income eligible. Case et al. (2005) find low takeup in all age
eligible children, of 33%, but much higher takeup among the very poor. By
2008, takeup was approximately 60% of all children under the age of 15(Woolard
et al. 2009). Receipt in children under six months is low, but increases thereafter.
It appears that non biological caregivers find it very hard to apply for the grant
and often give up (Delany et al. 2008). The majority of caregivers are recorded
as the mother, even if the mother is non resident, possibly due to fear of an
unsuccessful application (Aguero et al. 2009). Approximately 10% of recipient
caregivers in the NIDS data set are not resident with the targeted child(Woolard
et al. 2009).
Grant receipt automatically exempts individuals from paying hospital costs
which may mitigate illness shocks. Grants may also make an individual more
trustworthy and thus more able to draw on social networks in times of need
(Goudge et al. 2009, Hunter & Adato 2007a). Interestingly enough, 50% of
mothers do not tell their partners they are receiving the grant (Hunter & Adato
2007a).
The literature of the effects of grant receipt has tended to focus on child
outcomes, such as school attendance, child hunger, weight and height z scores,
and child labour amongst others (Samson et al. 2008, Williams & Samson 2007,
Aguero et al. 2009, Budlender & Woolard 2006, Boler 2007, Samson et al. 2004).
There are few child outcomes for children below school going age in particular.
Other studies have focused on the effect on grade repetition, incidences of illness,
and creche or daycare attendance (Budlender, Burns & Woolard 2007). These
studies tend to include many controls in their regression specifications, in an
attempt to reduce omitted variable bias. Budlender & Woolard (2006) find the
grant is associated with increased grade repetition, and less illness. Budlender
& Woolard (2006) find a small positive effect of receipt on attendance, even for
children who are non recipients, but reside with grant recipients. Williams &
Samson (2007) do not find these coresident effects. Using KIDS data, Boler
(2007) finds pension or CSG receipt does not affect primary school completion
rates, but it does appear to protect boys from dropout. Most studies find
increased daycare attendance among beneficiaries (Budlender & Woolard 2006,
Boler 2007).
The causal path through which the CSG may affect school attendance may
well be through nutrition, which is documented by Yamauchi (2006), using KIDS
data.
A particular problem has been the difficulty of working with, and com-
paring across various data sets available, due to incorrect assignment of the
grant between caregiver and recipient, and lack of specific data on grant receipt
(Budlender & Woolard 2006, Budlender et al. 2005, Williams & Samson 2007).
The Labour Force Survey does not include data on grant receipt. NIDS 2008
wave 1 includes detailed information on grant receipt, and the precise nature
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and identification of the caregiver/recipient. The General Household Survey
collects data on grant receipt for the beneficiary, and the mother, but does not
explicitly link the child and the caregiver. KIDS data does *** (INGRID CAN
YOU FILL IN)
There is a large descriptive literature, from KIDS, GHS, NIDS and other
data, informing us as to the nature of child support grant beneficiaries and
recipients (Budlender et al. 2007, Aguero et al. 2009, Hunter & Adato 2007a,
Delany et al. 2008). Recipients households are likely to be larger, have less
income, obviously higher grant income, have less educated members, fewer assets
and employed members, and more likely to be situated in rural areas. Recipients
are overwhelmingly African and female (Delany et al. 2008). Grant receipt does
have positive poverty alleviating effects (e.g. Samson et al. 2004, Triegaardt
2005, Leibbrandt et al. 2010). However Hunter & Adato (2007a) note a drop in
remittences to households after receipt begins. Samson et al. (2004) find that
social grants may result in unfortunate household formation which preclude
successful job search, however grants may also be used to fund job search
Rates of receipt are lower for orphans, and for maternal orphans in particular
(Leibbrandt et al. 2010, Woolard et al. 2009, Case & Ardington 2006). Cash
grants mitigate the effect of being an orphan on educational outcomes but do
not eliminate it in KIDS data from 2004, (Boler 2007), and Africa Centre data
from 2004 (Case & Ardington 2006). Timaeus & Boler (2007) find the effect is
effectively cancelled out by grant receipt, in a larger sample from KIDS 2004.
An interesting question is how or whether grant income is shared in the
household, and what it is spent on. Delany et al. (2008) find that the CSG is
found is pooled with other household income in about half of all cases. The
authors find increased spending on food for recipients compared to eligible non
recipients, as well as uniforms and school fees.
Some studies have attempted to use matching methods, constructed control
groups, or regression discontinuity methods, to identify the true causal effect
of grant receipt, with varying degrees of success (Samson et al. 2008, Aguero
et al. 2009, Case et al. 2005, Ranchod 2006, Williams & Samson 2007). Samson
et al. (2008) create a panel data set from General Household Survey waves 2002
to 2004. They compare children who were age eligible, but did and did not
receive the child support grant. The grant is found to reduce child hunger and
increase school attendance among beneficiaries. Using continuous treatment
estimation strategies, Aguero et al. (2009) find a significant and positive effect
on height for age during the first three years of life. The estimates condition on
a measure for eagerness of the mother. Case et al. (2005) use a control group of
older siblings, and find CSG receipt correlated with higher school attendance,
but no attempt is made to control for imbalanced treatment and control groups,
or the eagerness of mothers. Ranchod (2006) finds lower labour participation
among elderly pension recipients, using a discontinuity approach in the 2000
LFS and IES data. These effects may reflect a simultaneity problem. It is not
clear that households on either side of the discontinuity point are similar in
characteristics, a key assumption for identification.
Grant receipt may encourage fertility, in particular among teens. Makiwane,
Desmond, Richter & Udjo (2006) use many datasets1, but find no pattern be-
1The 1995 and 1998 October Household Surveys, 1998 South African Demographic and
Health Survey, the 2001 Census, and the SOCPEN CSG receipt data.
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tween fertility and grant receipt, moreover few teen mothers report grant re-
ceipt. The authors claim teen fertility is levelling off, however they make this
claim based on 2003 DHS data, which has been discussed as having particularly
unreliable fertility estimates.
Some papers have examined the effect of grants on labour force participation,
however mostly focusing on the effect of the old age pension, which is much larger
than the child support grant (Bertrand, Sendhil & Miller 2003, Eyal & Keswell
2008, Posel, Fairburn & Lund 2006, Ranchod 2006, Williams & Samson 2007).
Some negative effects on labour force participation are found, which however
decrease in size from 1993 to 2001, and disappear once migrant workers are taken
into account. Williams & Samson (2007) make use of the step pattern in age
eligibility from 2002 to 2005, and find increased broad labour force participation
among participants. Their identification is based on a sample of mothers whose
eldest child becomes eligible, which disregards the effect of younger children who
may affect labour force participation equally.
4 Theory
4.1 Potential Mechanisms Through Which the Causal Ef-
fect Operates
What are the channels through which CSG receipt could affect labour market
outcomes? It may change a mother’s participation decision, or the number of
hours she works. The latter is less likely as most workers most likely do not have
this flexibility. The grant may also be used to fund or enable job search - through
payment of daycare or transport expenses. The grant amount is not large, but
could fund some portion of these expenses. Thirdly, the grant may raise an
individual’s reservation wage, resulting in fewer job offers being accepted.
4.2 Static Model of Labour Supply
The first possibility can possibly be illuminated if we consider the standard
static model of labour supply (Blundell & MaCurdy 1999), with an individual
who maximises utility U(y, l) over income y and leisure l, with nonwage related
income G, with the standard assumptions regarding the shape of the utility
curve and it’s first and second derivatives2. The individual works for h hours,
for wage w, and has total time allocation T . The following constraint of time:
h+ l = T , and income: y = wh+G, apply. Maximimising utility with respect to
these constraints results in the well known tangency condition, that a solution
occurs when wage w equates to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and income MUlMUy .
This solution can occur at an interior point, and the individual will choose
to work some non zero number of hours, or at a corner solution, where the
individual is satisfied with non wage income G, which includes the grant, and
does not work at all. The corner solution is more likely if w is low, or G is high.
The child support grant is not large in comparison to the old age pension, and
the disability and foster grants.
2U1 and U2 > 0, both U11 and U22 < 0.
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Whether an individual starts from a corner or interior solution, it is the shape
of the indifference curves which dictates the final position when G increases upon
receipt of the child support grant. An increase in G shifts the budget curve
outwards, and is regarded as a pure income effect. We totally differentiate our
expression for utility, U(wh+G,T−h), in order to establish the sign of dhdG . The
result3 tells us that whether or not G raises h depends on whether or not leisure
is a normal good - the familiar income effect result. This is generally assumed
in the literature but cannot be taken for granted in the South African context,
and in particular not amongst this group of women, given their documented
high levels of unemployment. If leisure is a normal good, then a rise in G is
associated with a fall in labour supply, h. Similarly, an increase in the wage w,
will imply a fall in h, due to the income effect, if leisure is normal. The reverse
predictions apply if leisure is an inferior good.
4.3 Including Fixed Costs of Working
Our hypothesis is that the grant helps in some way to alleviate the costs associ-
ated either with job search or working. A fixed monthly cost is introduced, for
instance transport cost (TC), and a cost associated with each hour of working,
for child care (CC), if the child is below school age. Individuals maximise utility
U(y, l), and decide how many hours of labour to supply. We have the following
situation:
y = G if h = 0 (1)
y = (w − CC)h+G− TC if h > 0 (2)
It is not preferable for a woman to work if her net wage w−CC is negative,
no matter how high G is, or how low TC is. For those earning minimum wage,
without free or very cheap childcare, we may see an increase in G, from a child
becoming eligible, not resulting in any change in labour supply, or participation.
Once the woman’s youngest child is school going age, the cost of child care CC
is greatly reduced, or is zero, and whether the woman works or not is mainly
dependent on the size of TC in relation to G.
TC enters the equation the same way that G does, and thus dhdG will depend
again on whether leisure is a normal good. We can immediately say that if
TC > G then we will not see a change in labour force participation among
these women. In certain groups, where the cost of working is high, for example
in rural areas, the grant may not affect labour market status. In particular,
if the grant is shared, we can expect it to have very little effect. However, in
some groups which already have higher G, such as those living in a household
with a pensioner, or with other higher income, we might expect to see the grant
affecting participation. We will also not expect to see moves from zero h to
small values of h, because of the presence of fixed costs.
4.4 Long Term Effects
Should the grant affect long term employment prospects? Mothers of children
aged 6 in 2002 would expect to lose the grant in the next year, and may have been
surprised by the change in age cutoff which was announced for 2003. Mothers
3See derivation in the appendix
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with children aged 10 in 2005 have received the grant for many years, and would
expect to receive it for more. Duration of receipt may be an important factor
to consider when evaluating the grant effect. If we make use of the step pattern
in receipt to aid in identification, it will be instructive to consider whether
or not the grant is seen as a transitory or permanent shock to income levels.
This implies the need to apply a more dynamic and long term approach to the
problem.
If an individual receives the grant for only a short period of time, and this
is known in advance, then we may expect them not to react to this shock
(Heckman & Macurdy 1980). However if an individual enters into receipt, which
is expected to continue for many years, we could expect to see no response to
this more permanent change, if labour supply behaves as consumption does in
the lifetime model. As Heckman & Macurdy (1980) states, it is very difficult to
determine the exact definition of permanent wages/income in the labour supply
model, and thus it may be hard to draw exact conclusions when thinking of this
model in this way.
It is possible to turn to many and varied models of behaviour and labour
supply decision making to solve this problem, such as unitary and non-unitary
models, job search models, and simple extensions to the static model of labour
supply. Given that 46% of the sample is married, a family labour supply model
may be helpful. Later we discuss our results and interpret them using the
interpretations mentioned above. In our estimations, we focus on the effect of
the grant, on the participation decision, and the probability of being employed
or unemployed, as we expect to see more movement in these variables than in
hours of labour supply. The theory discussed helps to interpret our results, but
does not determine the exact functional form of the empirical model used.
5 Data
Our intent was to make use of survey data which included information on actual
grant receipt, and allowed us to link data from children to their mothers. Use
was made of the October Household Survey (OHS) data in 1997 and 1998, and
the General Household Survey (GHS), from 2002 to 2008. Both are nationally
representative annual surveys. The OHS is weighted to the 1996 Census, and
collected data in 3000 enumeration areas (EAs), which totalled 30,000 house-
holds. It collects data on development indicators, and labour force outcomes,
such as unemployment.
The GHS is a multi stage stratified sample, which collects data in 3000
primary sampling units or EAs, having stratified by province, and type of area
(rural or urban) (General Household Survey Report, 2002). The GHS master
sample is drawn from the 1996 Census data. The use of the GHS and OHS
data together is a good fit, as the OHS was stopped after 1999, due to financial
constraints, and the GHS was introduced in 2002 to meet the subsequent need
which was felt for a survey which collected data on the effect of government
programs, and the level of development country wide. Access to services and
facilities, and measures of education and health, were to be recorded.
The OHS data contained full birth histories, and the GHS recorded the
mother’s person code, thus allowing us to make the link between mothers and
children. The OHS data were used in order to provide us with two pre-years
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which could be used as comparison data, before the grant was introduced uni-
versally. OHS data does exist for 1999, however a full birth history was not
provided in this year, rather only for the past 12 months which was not suit-
able for the purposes of this paper. Unfortunately the GHS only began to be
collected in 2002, and data on individual grant receipt (as opposed to house-
hold) were only collected from GHS 2003. Other nationally representative data
sets include the Labour Force Survey, collected from 2000, however without any
record of grant receipt.
A stacked data set of all the available years from 1997 to 2008 is built, which
includes: Age, race, sex, province, education, labour force status, whether the
person has an age eligible child or not, household size, number of children in
the household, marital status, CSG receipt, household income, weights.
5.1 Samples and Terminology
We make use of the terms used in the randomised experimental literature to aid
in understanding. Depending on the sample, when estimating the effect of child
support grant receipt on mothers, we refer to the group who report receipt, or
report having an age eligible child, as the treatment group. Depending on the
sample, those who do not report receipt, or have children older than the cut-off,
are referred to as the control group. Depending on the sample used, the control
groups created are more or less appropriate for comparison.
A number of samples are used in the analysis. We introduce diminutive
names for these samples, which shall be used from here on. The initial sample
consists of black mothers between the age of 20 and 45, who have at least one
child (referred to as the mothers sample, or the full sample). We then consider
the sample of mothers who have an eligible child (eligible mothers), and the
sample of mothers whose youngest child is aged within a year of the eligibility
cut-off (the plus minus 1 sample), or within 2 years (the plus minus 2 sample).
An example of the plus minus 1 sample in 2002 would be a mother whose
youngest child is aged either 6 or 7, as the age cut-off in 2002 was 7. The plus
minus 2 sample in 2002 would include mothers whose youngest children were
aged 5, 6 (treated), 7 or 8 (control). Reference is also made to the sample of
mothers who have any child aged within a year or 2 years of the age eligibility
cut-off, but no special term is attached to these women. We also make use of
the sample of mothers who are in the bottom 50 percentiles of household income
- this sample is referred to as the low income sample.
Data exists for mothers aged between 15 and 49, however it was decided to
use mothers aged 20 to 45 only. The teen mothers may be very different to
those mothers aged 20 or above, and similarly mothers aged 45 to 49 may be at
a different stage of life, and may not be likely to have a youngest child eligible
for the grant. These suspicions are confirmed later when we check the balancing
across the treated and control groups in this sample, and find it to be imperfect.
Table 1 shows the sample sizes of the various groups considered for analysis,
and their distribution over the years. The 1998 OHS sample is smaller than that
of 1997, due to budget cuts which occurred in 1998 however sample characteristic
means are similar across 1997 and 1998 (table A10). The plus minus 1 sample is
large enough for our purposes, although over the years the sample size naturally
decreases, from 1,380 in 1997 (using the 2002 definition of the plus minus 1
sample) to 387 in 2008. This decrease is due to the departure of children other
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than the youngest child from the household as the age eligibility cut-off increases.
We make primary use of the plus minus 2 sample, primarily to ensure the power
of our estimates is not compromised, and for other reasons which are detailed
below.
Seminar participants suggested using the sample of women whose eldest child
is or is not eligible. We considered the use of this sample for a short period.
The sample size of this group does not decrease over the cohorts, due to the
different family structure of these mothers - they have families with fairly young
children if their eldest child is near the eligibility cutoff in age.
Tables 1 through 6 were estimated using the eldest sample. Firstly, those
whose eldest child was above the cut-off age, may still have been receiving the
grant for a younger child. Thus those who were meant to form part of the control
group may in fact be treated. Secondly, the younger children of these women
were far more likely to affect their labour force participation status, as before
school starts, these children need childcare, otherwise the mother cannot work.
Initial balancing for this sample confirmed these suspicions, with the eligible
mothers in this group being significantly younger than the ineligible mothers,
less likely to be married, more likely to live in larger households, in particular
houses with more children aged under 7. These mothers were also less likely
to be broad labour force participants. Given these initial balancing results, we
were hesitant to trust any results with this sample, but estimated the levels
for them in any case. We found that the placebo regressions did not come out
insignificant, and rather showed that all that was being picked up here was an
age effect in this group. Similarly the DID estimates from table 5, replicated
for this sample, yielded similar results in the placebo. This line of enquiry was
then abandoned.
5.2 Data Comparability
It is difficult to link children with their mothers. We can only work with resident
children. We use two different techniques because of differences in data gathering
methods - OHS uses birth histories in 1997, 1998, and GHS records the mother’s
pcode.
Table A2 documents the results of the two methods used to generate data for
mothers. The reason for checking the efficacy and similarity of both methods is
that the 1997 and 1998 October Household Surveys link mothers and children
through a full birth history of resident children. In the 2002 General House-
hold Survey both a full birth history is taken, and the mother’s person code is
recorded, if she is resident. For the years 2003 to 2008, the General Household
Survey data only contains the mother’s pcode, and no birth history is taken.
Thus we can only use the one approach prior to 2000, and the other from 2003
onwards.
Luckily the 2002 General Household Survey contains both kinds of data, and
we are able to do a methodology check. The data is used to create the variables
needed for each mother, such as the number of children she has, the ages of her
youngest and eldest children, whether or not her children are age eligible for the
grant in that year. When beginning with the birth history data, the method
used is to proceed with the resident children mentioned in the birth history,
and collate these variables for the mothers based only on these children. When
beginning with the mother pcode route, one considers only resident mothers.
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There is a concern that these methods will yield different results, but in the
sample in question, of black mothers aged between 20 and 45, the means of the
variables gathered using these techniques are very similar, as are the sample
sizes. Significance tests (not shown) reveal some significant differences, but the
actual size of the differences is very small. Using the birth history method, we
count 2,347 women in the plus minus 2 sample in 2002, and 2,381 in the mother
pcode sample. The average household income for the birth history full sample is
R1,683.8 per month, and R1,685.6 for the mother pcode sample. Similarly, the
percentage of these mothers who have an age eligible child is 65.6% in the birth
history, and 65.4% in the mother pcode sample. The number of black mothers
identified by the birth history is 9,569, and by the mother pcode, 9,725.
5.3 Estimation Issues
5.3.1 Means Test vs. Controlling for Household Income
Eligibility for the Child Support Grant is made up of two components - age
eligibility, and income eligibility. The child in question must be under the age
limit of that year. In 2002, the age limit was 7, thus children aged from birth
to just under 7 years were age eligible to obtain the grant. A means test is
then administered, which takes the income of the caregiver into consideration.
On April 1st, 2002, the grant amount was R130 per month, (see table A11),
and the child received this amount if the caregiver’s income was below R1100
in rural areas, and R800 in urban areas. The decision was taken not to use
the actual means test to determine eligibility, as traditionally household income
data is very messy, and may be inaccurate. We choose to control for household
income instead, which also implies we do not limit our sample size unnecessar-
ily.Household income is a good proxy for the caregiver’s income, but it is not
accurate enough to use to determine those who are exactly eligible for the grant
in both respects. Similarly age data may be slightly mis-measured, which is
why we focus on the plus minus 2 sample for most of the analysis.
5.3.2 Correlation
It is likely that correlation exists between observations in each PSU, and that
this correlation persists over time. To correct, we cluster by PSU. The standard
errors increase only marginally, and do not change the significance of the results
(see table A9, where table 2 and 3 are partially replicated.). For simplicity, and
due to the lack of cluster variable in 1998, we elect to report the un-clustered
estimates.
Another form of worrying clustering is group level clustering due to the
research design. Possible differences across province in allocation/takeup of
grants could confound our results. As each province is in charge of its own
roll-out strategy, this could be problematic if individuals in each province year
cell contained strong correlation. In table A5 it is possible to see both the dis-
tribution of age eligibility, and household grant receipt, by year and province.
Given the construction of the sample, we expect to see these distributions shift-
ing over time, given the changes in the age eligibility cut-off which occurred in
many years. However, we can see patterns over the years which do have the
same eligibility cut-off. For instance, over 1997, 1998, and 2002, where the same
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cut-off of age 7 is used to calculate eligibility (2002) and as if eligibility (1997,
1998), we can see similar static patterns of age eligibility across the provinces,
which is comforting. For instance, in the Free State in 1997, 63% of mothers
have an age eligible child, while the corresponding figures for 1998 and 2002 are
64% and 61%. For Gauteng across 2005 to 2008, the numbers range from 87 to
89% with no apparent pattern.
High household CSG receipt in table A5 corresponds to higher proportions
of age eligible children in a logical pattern. For instance in 2004, eligible mothers
are 76% in Gauteng, and 85% in Limpopo. Similarly household CSG receipt is
36% in Gauteng, and 64% in Limpopo.
A possible solution is to estimate our results using BRL standard errors
which correct for any group level clustering. If the significance pattern doesn’t
change, then we should have no cause to worry. This seems extreme though
given the lack of evidence of group level clustering in the provinces.
When using nationally representative survey data as has been done here,
there is a debate as to whether to make use of weights in the estimations or
not. Weights are not used here, as the sample used is not representative of
the population. However un-weighted and weighted estimates do not differ
significantly4.
5.4 Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects
In each year that is considered, the effect of the CSG is identified by a slightly
different group of mothers, because of the frequent changes in cutoff age which
occurred. In 2002, we estimate the effect for mothers whose children are about
to enter school, and for whom many have not actually obtained the grant, as
takeup was low initially. In 2003, we estimate the effect for women who did not
receive the grant the previous year, and may not have applied for it in 2003, as
they may have expected to lose it the following year. Given the administrative
burden of application, many women may not have bothered if the expectation
was to receive the grant for only one year. Once the age limit changed to 14,
again we can expect takeup rates to be low for 13 year olds, as these children will
lose the grant in the next year, and thus only eager mothers could be expected
to apply for the grant. In 2008 in comparison, 13 year olds could have received
the grant since 2003.
We can conclude two things from the above discussion. First is that despite
the slightly less perfect balancing, reporting the plus minus 2 results may be
more convincing. Second, using a wide range of techniques and samples would
be beneficial, as the effect of the child support grant is far from homogenous
across the distribution of mothers.
6 The South African Labour Market
6.1 Sample Means
In table A10 we see the changing patterns in sample characteristics over the
years, for a sample of black women aged between 20 and 45. The average age
in this sample is nearly 33 in 1997, and remains constant over the years. From
4Unweighted estimates are available from the authors on demand.
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1997 to 2008, mean years of education rises from 8.5 in 1997 to 9.3 in 2008. The
percentage of women who are married falls from 49% in 1997 to 44% in 2008.
Household size declines from 6.4 to 5.8 individuals, and the number of children
per woman correspondingly declines from 2.6 to 2.1. Household income rises
from R1,282 a month, to R2,948.
From 1997 to 2002, there is a large change in the percentage of women who
are labour force participants, according to the broad definition (including dis-
couraged workers), from 65% in 1997 to 82% in 2001. There is a corresponding
rise in employment, from 28% to 35% in 2002, which remains fairly constant
through to 2008. Broad unemployment, conditional on labour force participa-
tion, does not change dramatically in this group, ranging between 56 and 60%
over the years.
6.2 Patterns
As seen in figure 3, there has been a large positive jump in the outcomes in
question from 1997 to 2008. We graph employment, unemployment, conditional
on participation (strict and broad), and labour force participation (strict and
broad, which is to say strict, and including discouraged workers). Given the his-
torically high numbers of discouraged workers, especially among black women,
we consider both strict and broad unemployment. All figures shown make use
of the full sample to calculate these rates - black mothers aged between 20 and
45, with at least one child. In this group, the rates of unemployment are not
particularly high. In 1997, just over 28% of this sample were employed, and
65% define themselves as willing and able to work, despite possibly not having
taken steps to look for work (broad labour force participants). Approximately
43% have actually taken steps to look for work, or are working. Of those who do
choose to participate, 56% are broadly unemployed, while 34% are unemployed
according to the strict definition.
By 2008, there has been a marked positive shift in the economy and the
labour force in particular. Employment has shifted up by 6%, broad labour
force participation by 12%, and strict by 15%. However, commensurate with this
increase in the number of participants, we see an increase in strict unemployment
of 7%, to 41%. Broad unemployment has fluctuated in the time period in
question, eventually settling to similar levels to those seen in 1997.
We estimate a simple model5 to predict these labour force outcomes, in
order to graph predicted employment, unemployment and so on, over the same
time period. These predicted values follow similar patterns over time to the
calculated mean values - see figure 4.
In figure 5, each labour force outcome is plotted against the age of the
woman’s youngest child, in order to ascertain how, on average, woman’s labour
force status changes as their children grow up. We use pooled data over all the
years. We can see that woman with younger children, below the age of 3, have
very low employment probability, of under 20%. This rises in a fairly linear
fashion with the age of the youngest child, reaching approximately 50% when
the child is aged 15. There are similar patterns to broad and strict labour force
participation, while unemployment correspondingly falls from a high of 53%
5The model controls for whether the woman has an eligible child, province fixed effects,
household size, number of children, the woman’s age and years of education, whether she is
married or not, and a measure for household income.
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(strict definition), to a low of approximately 25%, for a youngest child aged 15.
Having the child enter school at age 7 or thereabouts seems to push employment
up by a fair percentage. We need to be careful when evaluating the effect of
the child support grant when the age limit is 7, as the effect measured may be
due to the child entering school, and not the grant. These jumps in the graphed
outcomes are even larger for the predicted outcomes (figure 6).
Similar to the previous exercise, we again predict labour market outcomes,
for each group of women. For instance, we calculate predicted employment,
for the women whose youngest child is aged 0. Then for those whose youngest
child is aged 1, and so on. These figures are graphed against the age of the
youngest child - see figure 16. These calculations are performed in each year,
allowing us to see how the patterns in each outcome change over the years, and
over the age distribution. In figure 7, we can see the pattern in broad labour
force participation, which does not appear to have changed dramatically over
the years. Mother’s labour force participation rises as her youngest child grows
up.
We are now interested to see whether there are any clear patterns or discon-
tinuities in the data which arise around the age cut-off. It is difficult to know
for certain, as the data appear to be fairly volatile. We must remember that in
certain years, changes which occur slightly before the age cut-off could possibly
be attributed to the grant, if grant receipt begins to fall before the cut-off, for
reasons detailed above. In the years 2003 to 2005, it seems we should look at
changes slightly before the cut-off, as in each of these years, grant receipt falls
precipitiously before the age limit. In 2006, 2007 and 2008, we can confine our
attention to the area immediately after the cut-off. 2002 is also a good year
to look exactly at the cut-off, as for many years before this, there had been no
changes in the age eligibility rules. However, 2002 had an age limit of 7, which
is school going age, so may not be a good year for discussion, as it is hard to
separate out the effects of receipt, and school attendance, on mother’s labour
force status. What is strange is that in 2002 of all the years, we would expect
to see a large discontinuity at age 7, and we do not. It is possible that not all
children enter school exactly at age 7 however.
In the years 2002 to 2005, broad labour force participation falls slightly
before the age cut-off (figure 7). This pattern is seen in the predicted outcome
graph too - figure 8. For the years 2005 to 2008, when the age cut-off was 14,
it appears that mothers either reduce or keep their labour force participation
stable, once their child loses the grant.
Strict labour force participation falls before the cut-off in the years 2003,
2004 and 2005, and either remains constant or falls after the cut-off in the years
2006 to 2008 (figures 9 and 10). This effect appears weak but constant over all
the years. Predicted strict labour force participation seems to follow a similar
pattern.
Broad unemployment falls before the cut-off in 2003-2005, and after the cut-
off, in 2002, and 2006 to 2008 (figures 11 and 12). This might accord with
mothers entering the labour force after the child becomes ineligible, and looking
for jobs, but not finding them. Predicted broad unemployment does not display
a fixed pattern, rising in some years, and falling in others around the cut-off.
Strict unemployment falls before the cut-off in the years 2002 to 2005, and
after the cut-off in the years 2006 to 2008 (figures 13 and 14). However there is a
general downward trend over the age distribution, and it may be that we pick up
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an age effect, and not the effect of grant receipt. Without further investigation,
this is not conclusive evidence. Predicted strict unemployment falls before the
cut-off in 2002-2005, but appears to rise after the cut-off after 2007.
Employment seems to fall before the cut-off in 2003, 2004, and 2005. In 2006
and 2008, employment rises after the age cut-off (figures 15 and 16). In 2002,
we seem to see the effect of children becoming of school going age at age 7, as
employment rises around this point. Predicted employment is highly variable,
and no firm patterns can be seen.
In summary, broad and strict unemployment appear to fall around the cut-
off. If there is a pattern to labour force participation (broad and strict), it is
weak, but it seems it might fall around the cut-off. Employment does not seem
to show a firm pattern of change around the cut-off. It may be the case that
when the grant is lost, mothers look for jobs (as unemployment falls). However
it may be that this is due to mothers exiting the labour force, as we see a
corresponding fall in labour force participation after the cut-off. Thus the grant
could be helping mothers to remain in the labour force, and eventually, but not
immediately obtain jobs. To see an immediate change in employment would
be quite startling, given the small size of the grant. When these figures are
replicated for a low income sample6 more likely to be affected by grant receipt,
we see sharper patterns, similar to those discussed above7. We also see a sharp
fall in employment around the cut-off, which may imply that losing the grant
makes working unprofitable, without the grant to fund travel and child care.
This is speculation however - and given the overall variability in these graphed
outcomes, it may be a bit of a stretch to make this connection.
These graphs show us that if anything a fuzzy regression discontinuity design
would be appropriate, and certainly not a sharp one. Due to the relatively
small size of the grant, it is reasonable that it would not impact too sharply on
labour market status by itself, and indeed, it does not seem to. The graphed
outcomes are also fairly variable, and thus it is hard to ascribe the jumps we
see as due to the grant alone. However this does not imply we are not still
interested in the effect of the grant on labour market outcomes, rather that we
consider it in conjunction with other factors, and that we approach the problem
of identification from a number of different angles, including but not limited to
the regression discontinuity approach.
In our actual estimates of the effect of eligibility, or receipt, on labour market
status, we might expect to see eligibility associated with higher unemployment
(compared to ineligible mothers), slightly increased or no change in labour force
participation, and either no change or higher employment for eligible mothers in
low income households. Our estimates will measure the effect of grant receipt,
which is lost when mothers’ children become ineligible. We now turn to the full
estimates.
6.3 Patterns in Receipt
In figure 1, we plot child support grant receipt, against the age of the youngest
child, in each year. Each graph shows the age cut-off in red. Sadly we only have
data on individual receipt from 2003, as the 2002 GHS only records household
6The bottom 50 percentiles of the household income distribution - figures 17 to 28.
7These figures are available in the appendix.
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grant receipt. A mother is defined as receiving the grant, if either her child
is recorded as receiving the grant (the majority of cases), or if she reports
grant receipt. In the full sample, of those whose youngest child is aged 1, in
2003, approximately 24% report receiving the grant. It seems to take mothers
some time to establish grant receipt after their child is born, although this
initial figure climbs over time, from 16% to over 40% by 2008. This shows the
improved shared knowledge in communities about how to apply for a grant, and
fewer delays once the application has been received.
In each year that the age limit has changed, it appears to take time for the
knowledge to filter down to recipients and beneficiaries. For instance, the limit
changed from 7 to 9 in 2003. Very few mothers of 7 and 8 year olds report
receiving the grant in 2003 however. It is possible that those who do receive the
grant are simply the group which would naturally have fallen out of the system,
had the age limit not changed, but automatically continue to receive the grant.
Given these patterns, it seems likely that mothers who could apply to receive
the grant for one year only choose not to, due to the high administrative cost,
and the shortened period of receipt, as they may take some time to hear their
child is once again eligible. If the application process was also arduous when
they first applied for their child, or if their child was unlucky enough to always
just miss receiving the grant, they may not have high incentives to apply.
In the years in which the age limit does not change, or has not just changed,
there is a much sharper cutoff in receipt - for instance in 2006, 2007 and partic-
ularly 2008. This implies using a regression discontinuity design may be more
fitting in these years than others. In 2003 to 2005, the bandwidth would have
to be rather large, and a fuzzy design with IV estimates would seem to be indi-
cated. In table A4 we report individual grant receipt for actual children, rather
than their mothers. These means correspond to those seen for the mothers in
figure 1.
When making use of a regression discontinuity design, it is important to
check that the running variable, in our case, age of the youngest child, has not
been manipulated in order to gain access into the program. If this were the case,
we would expect to see bunching in the age distribution immediately before the
age cut-off. In figure 2, the numbers of children in our sample receiving the
grant are plotted for each year. There does not appear to bunching in the age
distribution, although this doesn’t rule out the possibility that mothers may lie
to the Department for Social Development regarding the age of their children,
although this would require some level of sophistication. It seems unlikely that
ages are being manipulated on a scale large enough to interfere with our results,
especially since beneficiaries begin to receive the grant years prior to the cut-off,
and it would be impossible for mothers to predict the changes in age limits in
future years.
In table A2 we investigate the change in grant receipt over the years8. No
data were recorded in GHS 2002 for individual grant receipt. In 2003, 38% of
all black mothers report living in a household which receives at least one CSG,
compared to 46% of mothers with at least one eligible child. Our plus minus
1 and 2 samples report living in 15 and 19% of households receiving the grant,
implying there is variability in this variable in our samples of interest. However
for individual grant receipt in the same year, the figures are lower. 31% of all
8These means are unweighted, however weighted means do not differ significantly.
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black mothers report receipt (either directly or through their child reporting
receipt), compared to 42% of mothers with an eligible child. In the plus minus
1 and 2 samples, the corresponding figures are 6 and 11%, implying some but
not very much variability in receipt in these samples. Receipt increases however,
and by 2008, the corresponding figures for the plus minus 1 and 2 samples are
31 and 35%. For household grant receipt, the figures are 45 and 48%.
7 Identification
7.1 Strategy
A simple regression of employment status on CSG receipt, or age eligibility,
conditioned on household income, may not eliminate endogeneity. CSG receipt
is correlated with many factors, such as wealth, health, educational status, and
other variables which may be unobserved. The coefficient on receipt may reflect
the effect of these other correlated variables, and not the true effect of receipt
itself.
The first strategy used is to make use of a sample suggested by the regression
discontinuity literature, in order to limit the sample to those in which receipt
may be considered random. This is combined with a second strategy to include
controls which attempt to reduce the endogeneity observed in receipt, such as
mother’s age, education levels, marital status, location, household size, and
others.
The third strategy used is to attempt to make use of information available
in the years pre-treatment, or pre grant rollout, and to use a difference in differ-
ences estimation. The difference in differences estimation, if all the assumptions
are met, cleans out both year and group effects, leaving us with the true effect of
receipt on labour market outcomes. A fourth technique is attempted, which is a
modified difference in difference, across consecutive years, where the pattern of
age eligibility allows us to identify valid treatment and control groups. Finally,
a fifth strategy is used, to presume a fuzzy regression discontinuity design might
be appropriate, given the pattern in grant take-up, and to instrument for grant
receipt with age eligibility, while controlling for household income.
7.2 Level Specification
We estimate a levels specification, in each year t separately, where an observation
i represents an individual.
Yit = α0 + α1Xit + βTreati + θZh + γWp + uit (3)
Where Yit represents one of the three outcomes of interest that we focus on,
namely broad labour force participation, unemployment conditional on par-
ticipation, and employment9 Xit is a vector of individual level characteristics
including number of children, age, years of education and a marital status bi-
nary variable. Treatit is the treatment variable under discussion, whether that
9All estimates are performed including in addition strict labour force participation, and
strict unemployment conditional on participation. However these results do not differ substan-
tially from their broad counterparts, thus we decide not to report them. Estimates available
from the authors on request.
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is individual grant receipt, or having one’s youngest child be age eligible. Zh
is a vector of household level characteristics, including household income and
size. uit is an idiosyncratic error. Wp are province fixed effects. In the pooled
sample, year fixed effects are included10. β is the coefficient of interest.
In table 2 we estimate equation (3) using individual grant receipt as the
treatment variable. These estimates are performed separately in the plus minus
2 sample, and the full sample. Despite including a variety of controls, it is
possible that we do not adequately eliminate the omitted variable bias associated
with grant receipt. Nonetheless we must start from this base, to see how these
results differ from future better specifications. In the full sample, receipt is
correlated with higher labour force participation, of between 2 and 3% over the
years, and in the pooled sample. This effect is significant at the 5% level in
most years. Similar size coefficients are seen in the plus minus 2 sample, but
they are not significant.
We see higher unemployment associated with receipt, in the full sample, and
this figure increases over the years, from 6% in 2003 to 15% in 2008, with 13% in
the pooled sample. Similar trends are seen in the plus minus 2 sample, although
the effect only becomes significant from 2006, and ranges between 7 and 10%,
with 8% in the pooled. This makes sense given our knowledge of grant receipt
in the plus minus 2 sample - the sharp cut-off in receipt is only really seen from
the year 2006 onwards. The effect on employment is negative in the full sample,
ranging from 4 to 11%, and it grows over time. These coefficients have high
levels of significance. However in the plus minus 2 sample, no significant effect
is really found, except in the pooled sample, of minus 5%, not as high as in the
full. It could be that omitted variable bias is lower in the plus minus 2 sample,
and thus the effect of receipt is closer to the true estimate. We do expect the
omitted variable bias to be negative, as all the omitted variables are expected
to have a negative effect on the outcomes (CHECK THIS)
In table 3, we estimate equation (3) using a treatment variable of whether
the mother’s youngest child is age eligible for the grant or not, and we control for
household income11. We do this firstly to check whether age eligibility is a good
proxy for grant receipt, as if it is this in part justifies its use as an instrument for
receipt, and it justifies our using age eligibility as our main variable of interest,
if the two variables measure the same effect on our outcomes under discussion.
We can also examine whether or not age eligibility as a proxy for receipt simply
measures an age effect, and if so whether or not we can isolate the effect of
receipt through eligibility by using the plus minus 2 sample.
We also estimate the effect of eligibility in 1997 and 1998, using the 2003
definition of eligibility, in order to ascertain whether or not we estimate a simple
age effect - that of having a younger child12. In the full sample, the effect on
labour force participation is similar to that of receipt, and slightly larger, ranging
between 2 and 5% from 2004 to 2008. In the two pre-treatment years, 1997 and
10For individual grant receipt, we pool the years from 2003 to 2008. For eligibility, we pool
the years 2005 to 2008, where the age eligibility cut-off is the same, to ensure we are measuring
the same effect. Seminar participants have recommended allowing the pooled eligibility sample
to include all the years from 2002 to 2008 - doing this makes no difference to the results.
11Creating a variable for whether or not the mother passes the means test is messy, and
not necessarily correct given that we may not have all the sources of income recorded in the
data. We elect not to do this.
12We decide not to use the 2002 definition, as this is too closely tied to the effect of having
one’s youngest child enter school.
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1998, we see that we are indeed measuring the effect of having a younger child,
in the full sample, as these coefficients are significant, for the most part. In the
plus minus 2 sample however, these placebo estimates do not yield significant
coefficients in 4 of the 6 estimates, but in 2 they do13.
The effect of eligibility on unemployment is also similar in direction and
significance to receipt, although these estimates are smaller. The eligibility
coefficient for unemployment ranges from 4 to 9% in the full sample. However
in the plus minus 2 sample there is only one significant coefficient, that of 9%
in 2008. Eligibility is associated with reduced employment of between 3 and 7%
over the years in the full sample, but again in the plus minus 2 sample, we see
only one significant coefficient, that of -7% in 2008.
We presume that in the plus minus 2 sample we are closer to reducing the
omitted variable bias associated with grant receipt, or age eligibility. It seems
the negative effect of grant receipt on labour market status is all but eliminated
when we reduce OVB, by using age eligibility. However we are not left with
much else which is significant. Both tables 2 and 3 are estimated for white
women, a group which shows very low levels of CSG receipt. For table 3, this
shows the simple age effect of having a younger child, which is seen to have
indeterminate and inconsistent effects on participation and unemployment, and
to raise employment in some cases. For table 2, the estimates are not significant.
We now move onto the differences in differences estimates, which make use
of extra information in the pre-treatment years to aid our understanding.
7.3 Difference in Difference
A difference in differences estimator involves pooling data across pre and post
treatment years, and making use of time and group dummies to net out these
effects, leaving the true effect of treatment in the post year. The first assumption
is that our defined treatment and control groups are similar in characteristics
prior to treatment beginning in the post year. In case they are not however, we
include controls for the observed characteristics for which we have data. These
controls should be netted out by the inclusion of the time and group dummies,
but they aid in increasing the precision of the estimates. The second assumption
is that the composition of the groups does not change from the pre year to the
post year, an assumption which is checked when we examine the age distribution
of youngest children, and find it does not change over the age eligibility cut-off.
However should our treatment and control groups not be similar in the pre
treatment year, this would cast doubt on the assumption of similar trends in
both groups, prior to treatment. Thus before we estimate the coefficient in
question, we run balancing tests to ensure that our assumption of similar means
are correct. The specification for the balancing tests is as follows:
Xit = α+ βTreati + µit (4)
Where Xit refers to any one of the observed characteristics of age, years
of education, marital status, household size and number of children, house-
hold income, and pre-treatment labour market outcomes. This specification
13In estimates using the plus minus 1 sample, the placebo estimates are all insignificant.
However there is a tradeoff between statistical power, and balanced coefficients across the age
cut-off. We choose to focus on the plus minus 2 sample to increase the power of our treatment
variable estimates, due to the nature of the grant receipt pattern over the years.
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is estimated for the pre-years, pooled and separately, for a number of differ-
ent samples. We choose to report the results of the 1997 balancing tests, due
to space constraints. The other estimates do not differ significantly. We also
ran specifications in which we included province dummies, as the proportion of
eligible children may differ by province - these estimates do not differ in sig-
nificance. We choose to report the simple specification instead, as this allows
us to report α, which is the mean value of the characteristic in question, for
the control group (those who have Treati equal to zero). If the assumption of
equal characteristics across the groups is correct, we should expect to see the
coefficient on Treati emerge as insignificant.
In table A3, the results of specification (4) are shown in 3 different samples
- the full sample, and the plus minus 1 and 2 samples (youngest child is aged
either 1 or 2 years close to the cut-off). In the full sample, we see that the
mean value for the control group for age is 38 years. Treated individuals (those
whose youngest child is age eligible, using the 2003 definition14) have a mean
age which is lower by 6.71 years, and this difference is significant (the T statistic
is 55.46). This makes sense, as mothers with eligible children are bound to be
younger than those whose children are not age eligible.
Similarly, we see other significant differences which have been reported in
the literature. Mothers of eligible children have 0.88 more years of education
(possibly due to their lower age, and the improved education available when they
went to school), are no less likely to be married, live in households which are
larger (the difference is 0.84 children), have 0.51 more children on average, have
lower household income of 202 rand, have unemployment probability which is 17
percentage ppoints higher, are less likely to be in the labour force (10 percent),
and are less likely to be employed (16 percent). These results confirm our earlier
suspicion that eligible mothers are different to the rest of the general population,
and the specification estimated in tables 2 and 3 may be flawed.
Columns (1) and (2) convince us that using the full sample may not be
indicated in the difference in difference estimator. When we turn to the plus
minus 1 and 2 samples, in columns (3) to (6), we see that these differences mostly
fall away. Eligible mothers in these two samples do not differ in their labour
market status in the pre-treatment years, nor in marital status, household size,
and years of education. They do still differ in age, which is reasonable, and
household income in the plus minus 1 sample. However in the plus minus 2
sample, this difference is not significant. Thus we choose to use the plus minus
2 sample for the difference in difference estimator, as it is both large enough to
afford us enough statistical power, and it is balanced across the characteristics
in question. We do control for mother’s age in the specification.
We perform more extensive balancing tests for the plus minus 2 sample,
across the 4 age cut-offs, in table A8. Again we see that age is always signifi-
cantly lower for eligible mothers. Household size is significant for the test across
the 2004 age limit, as are labour force participation and employment. Thus
mothers whose youngest child is younger than 11 in 1997 are less likely to be
labour force participants, or employed. There is no institutional or structural
connection to this specific age which gives us cause for concern, but these results
do convince us to pay attention to the 2004 results.
14We run the balancing tests using the 2002 definition of age eligibility, age 7, but decide
not to report them. They reveal similar patterns to 2003, but we felt the significance of 7 as
the school going age meant our results might be mis-interpreted.
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The difference in difference estimator is obtained from the following specifi-
cation, using a regression in a pooled dataset over the years in question.
Yit = α0 + α1Xit + γPostt + βTreati + δPosttTreati + θZh + γWp + µit (5)
Where Yit, Xit, Zh, and Wp are defined as in the levels specification. Now
however Treati refers only to age eligibility of the youngest child. Postt is a
binary variable for whether an observation originated in the pre-years of 1997
and 1998, before the grant was introduced, or in the post years we consider, of
2002 to 2008. δ is our coefficient of interest, as it represents the effect of age
eligibility (our proxy for grant receipt, when we control for household income),
cleaned of the effects of both time, and group effects related to having an age
eligible and therefore being the mother of a younger child.
We estimate equation (5) in different stacked data sets, in table 4. We pool
the pre-years 1997 and 1998, with each post year separately, as each of 2002,
2003, 2004 and 2005 have a different age limit. We also then pool the pre years
with 2005 to 2008, as the age limit remained 14 in each of these years. Year
dummies are included.
Using a DID estimator, we can remove the effect of time on CSG receipt, and
the effect of differences between eligible and ineligible households, or mothers.
The key assumption is of similar trends pre treatment in each group, which
would have continued on a similar path had treatment not occurred. In general,
difference in difference estimators are performed on pre and post years which
are close together in time, lest other shocks disturb the assumption of similar
trends. In our case, thanks to the nature of the data available, and the pattern
of receipt, which only builds to significant levels from 2002, we do not have
much choice in the matter of which years to use. However we do realise this
means some of our estimates may be capturing any other large structural change
in these years. We do not build completely on these results, but use them to
inform us further.
The estimates in table 4 appear to show that the levels may not have ap-
propriately dealt with the endogeneity of receipt or age eligibility. We estimate
equation (5) using the plus minus 2 sample, and then the low income sample.
Having an age eligible child raises the probability of being a labour force partici-
pant by between 5 and 10% in the plus minus 2 sample, and between 9 and 12%
in the bottom 50 sample. The probability of being employed does not change
significantly in the plus minus 2 sample, but falls in the low income sample
by between 9 and 13%. Broad unemployment, conditional on participation, is
higher for eligible mothers by between 7 and 12%, but these effects are only
significant in the 2007 and 2008 pooled samples. In the low income sample,
unemployment rises by between 15 and 22%, and these effects are significant
from 2005 onwards.
In order to test that we do not measure a simple age effect, we estimate
placebo specifications, using 1997 as the pre year, and 1998 as the post year,
with equation (5). If we are simply estimating an age effect, we would expect
these coefficients to emerge as significant, however they do not. Similarly, we
estimate table 4 using the corresponding group of white mothers, aged 20 to 45.
No significant effects are found. These estimates are available from the author
on request.
We now move onto the fourth strategy, that of the modified difference in
differences.
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7.4 Modified Differences in Differences
In table 5, we take advantage of the pattern of change in the age eligibility cutoff
which creates natural comparison groups. For instance, between 2002 and 2003,
the age limit changed from 7 to 9. We make use of the sample of mothers of 7
to 10 year olds, in both years. In 2002, no child in this group receives the child
support grant, while in 2003, the 7 and 8 year olds are eligible to receive the
grant. We estimate equation (5), with Treati defined as being the mother of
a 7 or 8 year old, control defined as the mother of a 9 or 10 year old, and the
Postt year defined as 2003. The interaction between Treati and Postt yields the
coefficient of interest - the effect of grant receipt, net of year and group effects.
Once again, control variables are included in order to increase the precision of
the results. There is no specific reason to suggest why mothers of 8 or 9 year
olds should differ, especially if we have controlled for the age of the mother.
Another advantage to this method is that now observations are compared very
closely in time, which reduces the possibility that some other trend or shock is
confounding our results.
Before we plunge into these estimations, we once again run balancing tests,
using equation (4), to check the critical assumption of equal characteristics
across treatment and control groups. Previously these balancing tests were run
for 1997, now we run them in each year from 2002 to 2008, across each age limit.
The results are presented in table A7, for the plus minus 2 sample. Once again
for the ease of reporting, province fixed effects are omitted, although the results
do not differ significantly if they are included.
In 2002, we see in table A7 that mothers whose youngest child is eligible
are on average 1.63 years younger than ineligible mothers, and this difference is
significant (the T statistic is -6.22). This age difference is significant across all
the years, although it is particularly large in 2002. Similarly, number of children
is larger for eligible mothers, although this difference is not large. The majority
of the balancing tests do not reveal significant differences, which supports our
use of the difference in difference estimation in table 5.
In 2002 however, due to the age cut-off value of 7, we do see significant
differences, as this is school going age. Mothers with an eligible child in 2002
are on average 7% more likely to be unemployed, 3% less likely to be in the
labour force, and 7% less likely to be employed. These pre-treatment significant
differences tell us we should be wary of the results for 2002, but we are confident
with the other years.
Table 5 measures something slightly different to the estimates in table 4, as
previously we were estimating the effect of eligibility for two groups, where one
of the groups lost eligibility, from the pre year to the post year. Here one of the
groups gains eligibility from the pre year to the post year. Together with the
close proximity of the years, we may be identifying a more precise version of the
eligibility effect. Again controls are included to improve precision and control
for any differences not netted out by the time and group fixed effects. A pooled
sample of the years 2002 to 2008 is also used in column (4), where we compare
the mothers of those aged 11 to 14 to those aged 14 and 15, with the pre years
being defined as 2002 to 2004.
We see that age eligibility is associated with no significant change in labour
force participation in each of the separate year difference in difference estimates,
however the pooled sample shows an increase of 4%, and 5% in the low income
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sample. Broad unemployment conditional on participation falls by between 6
and 8% in 2003 and 2004 in the plus minus 2 sample. Employment rises by
between 6 and 8%, but no significant coefficient is seen in the pooled sample, or
in the low income sample. These estimates are very different to those in tables
2,3 and 4.
Placebo regressions are also estimated in the years 2005 to 2006, 2006 to
2007, 2005 to 2008, using an artificial age limit cut-off of 10. These coefficients
should not be significant, and indeed they are not. Column 2 of table 5 is
replicated for many different groups, to establish the robustness and origin of
this result. The results are presented in table 6. To a lesser or greater extent,
the effects are very robust and fairly similar across the different groups.
Women who are in the top 50 percentiles of the household income distri-
bution are affected more strongly by grant receipt, with an increase in average
employment probability of 11%, and a fall in unemployment, conditional on
participation, of 11%. The grant effect is slightly smaller for those with a ma-
tric compared to those who do not have a matric15, with those lacking a matric
seeing unemployment fall by 10% on beginning receipt.
Married woman are very slightly more affected by the grant, similar to those
in the top 50 percentiles of the income distribution. Those who live in a house-
hold with a pensioner have a stronger effect due to grant receipt. Women
who are in their 20s see the largest effect due to grant receipt - an increase
in employment probability of 15%, and a fall in unemployment, conditional on
participation of 14%, and very large increase in labour force participation of
9%. The effects decrease with age. White women do not see any effect due to
grant receipt.
We now move on to the instrumental variables estimates, which are moti-
vated by use of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design.
7.5 Regression Discontinuity
It is possible to make use of the allocation design of the child support grant to aid
us in our estimation of the effects in question. Around the age eligibility cutoff,
we expect to see a sharp discontinuity in receipt. In table A4, the distribution of
individual grant receipt is shown, by age and year. The cutoff line is highlighted
in black. It is possible to see the sharp decrease in receipt in every year, following
the cutoff line. In some years, such as 2003 or 2004, receipt is not high in the
age group just before the age eligibility cutoff. This could be due to mothers
who do not bother to reapply for the grant when their child is going to lose it
the next year, or is expected to lose it, if the announcement of the new cutoff
is delayed. Another possible problem is measurement error in the age variable,
and those reporting low receipt in the age year group before the cutoff, are
actually ineligible for the grant.
It seems given the patterns seen in table A4 that a sharp or possibly fuzzy
regression discontinuity design might be indicated. As in our previous speci-
fications, we do not have access to a valid counterfactual - we cannot observe
what mothers’ outcomes would have been had their children not received the
grant, for those with eligible children. We assume that treatment is essentially
15Matriculation status is achieved on completing 12 years of education, and passing the
Department of Education examinations, which are written nation wide.
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endogenous - many factors are correlated with child support grant receipt, such
as household income, education levels, health status, and others. Thus even
when controlling for as many observables as we reasonably have data for, we
expect our estimate of the effect of treatment to be flawed.
Assignment to grant receipt, conditional on passing the means test, is a
deterministic function of the age of the child, as follows:
CSG = 1[Age < Age∗] (6)
We know that the probability of being treated changes sharply at Age∗, however
other characteristics such as household income, education, etc should not change
dramatically around this point. The balancing tests in tables A3, A7 and A8,
have established that this is the case, both in the pre-year of 1997, and across
the years 2002 to 2008.
For the sharp RD, we feel comfortable restricting our sample to a small
bandwidth around Age∗, and then simply regressing our outcome on the treat-
ment, as was done in the level estimates in tables 2 and 3. If we assume some
fuzziness in the design, i.e. that some individuals who are aged above the cutoff
still obtain receipt, and those who are eligible do not all obtain receipt, then it
may be appropriate to instrument for treatment with age eligibility. If we move
to a fuzzy RD, we more closely approximate the IV results estimated in table
(IV).
This assumes we can only estimate the average treatment effect at Age∗, one
particular point in the age distribution of children, by comparing the mean of the
outcome variable immediately to the left and the right of Age∗. The assumption
is that the only difference in outcomes between those who are treated and those
who are not, on either side of the cutoff point, is due to the treatment itself,
and nothing else. It may be that this effect is not very similar to the effect of
the treatment for the entire population. Mothers who have children aged 6 in
2002 may be very different to those with children aged 2 or 3 - thus it is possible
that we cannot generalise our results.
A possible check is to graph employment outcomes from the previous year
on age of the child in this year, in each district (the smallest geographical unit
which is repeatedly sampled). Employment in 2002 should be very important in
determining employment in 2003, but should not be seen to have a discontinuity
around the age eligibility cutoff in 2003. If we do see a discontinuity, we have
reason to worry that some other factor is driving our results.
It is important to know that our choice of bandwidth does not drive our
results. We would expect to see the results more imprecisely estimated, but
largest in size, with the smallest possible bandwidth. As our bandwidth grows,
the estimates may tend towards zero, but should increase in significance. Ideally
we would like the effects estimated not to change significantly with the band-
width. All the relevant tables have been run for the plus minus 1 sample, and
similar coefficients are reported16.
The granularity of our data is potentially a problem. We cannot talk about
the asymptotics of approaching the age cutoff, as we only have rounded age
data. A potential robustness check, from Lee & Card (2008) is to check that
our results are not sensitive to clustering at the level of the data. If clustering
does not increase the size of the standard errors, then the discreteness of the
16These estimates are available from the authors on request.
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data is not a problem - those observations clustered in the same age group have
similar data, and it is not a problem that a few observations may be mis-assigned
to the wrong group (eligible to non-eligible, or vice versa). All tables have been
estimated with and without clustering, and the size of the standard errors does
not change significantly.
The difference in difference estimates may not be credible if treated individ-
uals (mothers of 6 year olds) differ significantly from mothers of 7 year olds,
over time. If for instance school attendance rates jumped significantly between
1997 and 2002, our DID over the years 1997-2002 might not be appropriate. A
regression discontinuity design controls for this possibility, by holding constant
random variation in labour market status among treated and control individu-
als.
Takeup was initially slow. In 2002, only 23% of mothers who had an eligible
child, lived in a household which reported grant receipt. This figure increased
to 65% in 2008. There is variation in CSG receipt in our sample of interest -
black mothers whose youngest child is aged within a year of the cutoff - 35%
report living in a HH which receives a CSG.
7.6 Instrumental Variables
In the plus minus 2 sample, we make use of 2SLS to estimate the effect of grant
receipt on labour market outcomes. We instrument for individual grant receipt
(as reported by either the mother or the child), using whether the mother has
an age eligible child. We first consider whether this is a plausible instrumental
variable, when used in this manner. Whether the child is 6 or 7 can be considered
random in the sample of mothers with children aged 6, or 7. Thus if controls for
the age of the mother are also included, we could possibly assume that having
an age eligible child only affects the mother’s labour market outcomes through
its effect on grant receipt, in this sample. The IV must also predict treatment; if
the child is aged six, he or she is age eligible for the grant, and may be receiving
it, however rates of receipt drop sharply above the age eligibility cutoff. See for
instance in table A4, in 2003. 2% of 9 year olds, and 1% of 10 year olds report
grant receipt. These figures can be considered zero for all intents and purposes.
Thus the probability of receipt is different, depending on the different values of
the instrument.
Monotonicity should in theory also be satisfied, as it would be extremely
unlikely for a child who was age eligible to not receive the grant, and then when
age ineligible to somehow receive the grant - this is not rational behaviour on
the part of the mother, and it could be expected that the number of mothers
like these would be small. The probability of there being defiers in the sample is
very low, due to the structure set up by the Department of Social Development
- when a child hits the age cutoff, they automatically stop receiving the grant.
Similarly it is difficult for a child to obtain the grant without proof of age. The
estimate we obtain for the effect of the child support grant on labour market
outcomes could also be conceivably fairly close to the Average Treatment Effect,
as there is no good reason, having controlled for mother’s age, that the group
of mothers who respond to this instrument is very different to those who don’t.
The specification used for the IV results is as follows:
Yit = α0 + α1Xit + γCSGi + βTt + θZh + γWp + µit (7)
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Where CSGi is grant receipt, which is instrumented for by Treati, a binary
variable for whether or not the mother’s youngest child is age eligible or not.
Yit, Xit, Zh, and Wp are defined as in the levels specification. We include year
fixed effects Tt when estimating equation (7) in a pooled sample of the years
2006 to 2008. The years 2006 to 2008 are used for the IV estimates, due to the
nature of the grant receipt pattern, and the first stage results, which show the
instrumental variable is weak in the years 2003 to 2005. We do not have data
on individual grant receipt in 2002. This specification is estimated in the plus
minus 1 and 2 samples, and the low income sample - see table 7.
Given the lack of data on grant receipt, the samples obtained are not large.
Unfortunately, we do not obtain conclusive results using this technique. In the
smallest sample (plus minus 2), the instruments are very weak in places, and
thus we do not obtain significant coefficients on grant receipt. Despite that our
outcomes are binary, we elect to use standard 2SLS, taking the bad with the
good of the linear probability model - our coefficients are easy to interpret, and
comparable, but they are not limited to the range between zero and one, and
indeed they do not always stay in that range. This unfortunate phenomenon
however only occurs in cases where the instrument is very weak (below 0.05).
In other combinations of years and outcomes, the instrument is stronger (0.45
to 0.6), but the results obtained are mostly insignificant.
There is no significant pattern of association between grant receipt and
labour force participation in any of the samples. Broad unemployment appears
to increase with grant receipt, by between 15 and 32 percentage points in the
plus minus 2 sample. Employment appears to fall in 2008 for those receiving
the grant, but we do not see this significant coefficient in the other years. For
the most part, the results are inconclusive.
Part of table 7 shows the IV estimates for the full sample, which is not
entirely permissable given that the IV loses its justification as a valid IV in
this sample, and rather represents the effect of having a younger child. The
full sample results accord fully with the levels and DID, which is interesting as
those results were obtained using the plus minus 2 sample. It is possible that
having controlled for various important characteristics such as age of the mother,
education, marital status, province, number of other children, and household
income, it is possible that our IV is still randomly assigned in these groups,
but unlikely. In the full IV sample, the effect of CSG receipt is to increase the
probability of being in the broad labour force by between 7 and 15%, not to affect
strict labour force participation at all, and to affect employment probability
negatively, by between 5 and 13%. These effects are not as strong when we
estimate the effect of having an age eligible child on household CSG receipt,
which is sensible as we would not expect household CSG to have much effect on
individual labour market outcomes, especially if resources are shared equally, or
not at all.
7.7 Mechanisms
In table A6, we estimate equation (3) using 3 new outcome variables, in order to
shed some light on the causal mechanisms through which grant receipt affects
labour supply. Not many variables exist in the General Household Survey to
aid in this question. We examine the number of children of school going age
(7 to 15) who attend school, the number of children of below school going age
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(0 to 7) who attend a creche or daycare of some sort. We also examine the
number of children not attending school due to lack of money for fees. In all
these specifications, the number of children, and the number of children aged
under 7 are included as variables on the right hand side, as well as the other
usual characteristics.
We find that receiving the child support grant increases the number of chil-
dren going to school, conditional on the number of children that the mother
has. This effect is significant and consistently a similar size across the years.
Grant receipt is associated with an increase in the number of children attending
school by between 0.08 to 0.12 across the years in the plus minus 2 sample, and
by 0.04 to 0.20 in the full sample. There is no change in the number of children
reporting not attending school due to lack of money for fees, which is expected
as this variable has a very low mean to begin with. The number of children aged
under 7 attending daycare increases with receipt by between 0.3 and 0.12, with
the biggest effect seen in 2003. These effects are significant at the 1% level.
Thus we see that grant receipt could be funding daycare, and the costs
associated with sending a child to school. This simple model does not account
for the number of child support grants received. We have no data for transport
costs associated with getting to work.
8 Discussion
We feel that table 5 contains not only the most robust results, but also the most
econometrically correct. From table 5 and 6 we conclude that the grant has a
positive effect on labour market participation and employment probability, and
reduces unemployment. These effects are not small.
8.1 Connection to the Theory
We expected that if fixed costs of working were high, we might expect to see
the grant have an impact for those in slightly higher income households, who
already are some way towards funding these costs. This we see in table 6. We
also expected that changes in eligibility which were anticipated would be reacted
to less substantially, if we accept a permanent income hypothesis. This we see
in table 5, where already by 2005, knowledge of the grant, and the age cut-off
is growing, and the size of the effect is smaller.
Younger women respond much more to receipt of the grant, and this may
again imply a lack of funds to overcome the fixed costs of working. It is possible
that for this group of women in particular, either their indifference curves are
very peculiarly shaped, or leisure is an inferior good. Simply put, the predic-
tion that a rise in G would lower h is not seen here, or is not reflected in the
participation and employment decisions.
8.2 Other Issues
Another concern is that the results estimated are due to some other issue which
arises at the cutoff. For instance, in the year 2002, the age cutoff is 7. Children
in South Africa enter school at age 7, thus potentially freeing their mothers
to enter the labour force. Thus the effect we estimate in 2002 may not be
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entirely attributable to the effect of the grant, and it may not be in the expected
direction. Those with an eligible child in 2002 are being compared to those who
have a school going child, and thus we might expect to see a negative effect.
Similarly in 2003, where grant receipt is not high in the age groups before the
cutoff, and children may enter school late, we may again be seeing the effect
of having a non school going child, rather than the effect of the grant. What
we do see both in table 2 and 3, is that the effects estimated in 2002 and 2003,
where the age cutoffs were 7 and 9, are mostly zero or negative, with only the
coefficient in the employment status model in 2002 reported as negative and
significant. Another reason why the effects seen in table 5 and 6 strengthen in
size and significance over the years is that grant takeup initially rose slowly from
very low levels. It is difficult to separate these two effects, that of low takeup,
and school entrance.
It is important to remember that like work done with the South African Old
Age Pension, the effects are identified using only resident children and mothers.
We do not include the effect of CSG receipt by mothers whose children are
not resident, whether those children have been sent away to family, or the
mother has left the home to seek work. Thus the negative effects on labour
force participation which are found in the levels estimates may be mitigated if
we take into account the possible positive effect of remittances sent by working
mothers.
Seminar participants suggested replicating these results but excluding house-
hold income as a control. Household income is endogenous, due to mis-measurement,
and to its correlation with other unobserved factors. Replication of tables 2, 3, 4
and 5 excluding household income do not yield a significantly different estimate
of the effect of the grant, or eligibility. If the coefficients do vary,the variation
is very small.
9 Conclusions
Using a stacked data set from the OHS and GHS from 1997 to 2008, we in-
vestigate the effect of the child support grant on labour market participation,
unemployment conditional on participation, and employment status, in a group
of black mothers, aged 20 to 45. We exploit the step wise pattern of receipt
from 2002 to 2006 to identify the effect of the grant.
We find that grant receipt is associated with a higher probability of being
the labour force, lower unemployment probability for those who do participate,
and a higher probability of being employed. These effects are not small, ranging
as high as 15% for some groups. There is some heterogeneity in these results,
which accords with the theory of the static labour supply model, with a fixed
cost associated with working.
Much further work remains to be done at this point. Thus far, no attempt
has been made to exploit the variation in the number of child support grants
received by each woman, nor the duration in receipt, apart from passing ref-
erences. The variation in the grant amount over the years has also not been
exploited in any meaningful way, and it could help to shed further light on the
problem.
Another meaningful extension or check would be to see how two other im-
portant variables change in response to the grant. The first, actual weekly hours
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worked, may not be expected to change, if individuals do not have power to vary
their hours, but if we saw variation in this quantity, it would be interesting. The
other is earnings - if the grant enables women to be able to wait for better pay-
ing jobs, rather than taking the first available job, we would expect to see this
reflected in earnings. We may also expect to possibly see a difference between
changes in paid work, and unpaid work. We may find that the grant enables
women to seek paid work, rather than working for the household, or tending
crops or animals.
Another robustness check which is needed is to estimate equation (5) in table
5 without any controls, in order to see that the specification is not sensitive to
the distribution of the unobservables across the control and treatment groups
(Blundell & MaCurdy 1999).
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Figure 4: Predicted Outcomes Across Time
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Figure 5: Outcomes Pooled Across the Age Distribution of the Youngest Child
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Figure 6: Predicted Outcomes Pooled Across the Age Distribution of the
Youngest Child
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Figure 7: Broad Labour Force Participation
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Figure 8: Broad Labour Force Participation: Predicted
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Figure 9: Strict Labour Force Participation
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Figure 10: Strict Labour Force Participation: Predicted
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Figure 11: Broad Unemployment
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Figure 12: Broad Unemployment: Predicted
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Figure 13: Strict Unemployment
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Figure 14: Strict Unemployment: Predicted
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Figure 15: Employment
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Figure 16: Employment: Predicted
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Figure 17: Outcomes Across Time: Bottom 50 Percentiles of the Distribution
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Figure 18: Outcomes Pooled Across the Age Distribution of the Youngest Child:
Bottom 50 Percentiles of the Income Distribution
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Figure 19: Broad Labour Force Participation: Bottom 50 Percentiles of the
Income Distribution
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Figure 20: Broad Labour Force Participation: Predicted (Bottom 50)
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Figure 21: Strict Labour Force Participation: Bottom 50 Percentiles of the
Income Distribution
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Figure 22: Strict Labour Force Participation: Predicted (Bottom 50)
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Figure 23: Broad Unemployment: Bottom 50 Percentiles of the Income Distri-
bution
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Figure 24: Broad Unemployment: Predicted (Bottom 50)
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Figure 25: Strict Unemployment: Bottom 50 Percentiles of the Income Distri-
bution
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Figure 26: Strict Unemployment: Predicted (Bottom 50)
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Figure 27: Employment: Bottom 50 Percentiles of the Income Distribution
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Figure 28: Employment: Predicted (Bottom 50)
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Table 1: Sample Comparison
All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1997 49,469 15,583 12,222 10,315 8,422 3,261 5,567 1,380 2,697
1998 29,495 10,091 7,749 6,621 5,283 1,982 3,479 890 1,799
2002 38,211 12,888 9,725 8,139 6,358 2,188 3,968 1,165 2,381
2003 37,819 12,314 9,261 8,807 6,814 1,939 3,592 838 1,718
2004 36,760 12,091 9,159 9,572 7,410 1,817 3,258 621 1,255
2005 39,638 13,484 10,349 12,041 9,359 1,988 3,290 421 853
2006 39,019 12,689 9,752 11,273 8,760 1,770 3,018 424 820
2007 40,469 13,256 10,276 11,798 9,263 1,889 3,141 459 862
2008 34,180 11,336 9,277 10,006 8,286 1,525 2,685 387 794
Mothers
Full 
Sample
Mothers 
with 
Eligible 
Child
Black 
Mothers 
Eligible 
Child
Black 
Mothers     
 +- 1
Black 
Mothers     
  +- 2
Plus Minus 
1 Sample
Plus Minus 
2 Sample
All individuals in these samples are aged 20 to 45. Observations from 1997 and 1998 come from the October Household 
Survey, and from the General Household Survey for years 2002- 2008. The plus minus 1 sample refers to the sample of 
mothers whose youngest child is aged within a year of the age eligibility cutoff. For example, plus minus 1 in 2002 refers 
to mothers with children aged 6 and 7 (the cutoff is 7). Similarly the plus minus 2 sample refers to those whose children 
are aged within 2 years of the cutoff (aged 5, 6, 7 and 8). The full sample refers to black mothers who have at least one 
child.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Age Limit 9 11 14 14 14 14 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Plus Minus 2 Sample
Labour Force Participant -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
(Broad) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
0.02 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.06
Conditional on Participation (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Employed -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
1,709 1,244 846 814 855 787 6,255
Full Sample
Labour Force Participant 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
(Broad) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.12
Conditional on Participation (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Employed -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
9,204 9,109 10,288 9,716 10,220 9,190 57,727
Table 2: Labour Market Outcomes - Level Estimates of the Individual CSG Receipt Effect
Pooled
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
The sample includes black mothers aged 20 to 45 whose youngest child is aged within 2 years of the age eligibility 
cutoff. The table reports the coefficient on having an age eligible child in a specification which controls for household 
income, or the coefficient on individual report of grant receipt. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. The 
specification includes age, years of education, a marital status dummy, household income (based on salaries and 
pensions), province dummies. Clustering by PSU does not change the results significantly. The pooled sample includes 
years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.
Placebo Treatment
1997 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Age Limit 0 7 9 11 14 14 14 14 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Plus Minus 2 Sample
Labour Force Participant 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02
(Broad) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
-0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.03
Conditional on Participation (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Employed 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
1,873 2,368 1,710 1,246 846 815 858 789 3,308
Full Sample
Labour Force Participant -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04
(Broad) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.07
Conditional on Participation (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Employed -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
12,198 9,683 9,211 9,114 10,301 9,730 10,249 9,233 39,513
Table 3: Labour Market Outcomes - Level Estimates of the Age Eligibility Effect
Pooled
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
The sample includes black mothers aged 20 to 45. The table reports the coefficient on having an age eligible child in a specification 
which controls for household income, or the coefficient on individual report of grant receipt. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. 
The specification includes age, years of education, a marital status dummy, household income (based on salaries and pensions), 
province dummies. Clustering by PSU does not change the results significantly. The pooled sample includes years 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008.
Pre '97/'98 '97/'98 '97/'98 '97/'98 '97/'98 '97/'98 '97/'98 '97/'98 1997
Post 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005-2008 1998
Age Limit 7 9 11 14 14 14 14 14 7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Age Eligibility
Labour Force Participant 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.02
(Broad) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.05
Conditional on Participation (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Employed -0.03 0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
5,058 3,583 2,598 1,681 1,650 1,693 1,624 4,710 4,484
Bottom 50th percentile of Household Income
Labour Force Participant 0.01 -0.03 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.01
(Broad) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.16 -0.01
Conditional on Participation (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Employed 0.02 -0.04 0.10 -0.09 -0.04 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
2,656 1,883 1,325 826 784 851 775 2,310 2,409
Table 4: Labour Market Outcomes - Difference in Difference Estimator
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
The sample includes black mothers aged 20 to 45 whose youngest child is aged within 2 years of the age eligibility cutoff. Standard Errors are 
reported in parentheses. The specification includes age, years of education, a marital status dummy, household income (based on salaries and 
pensions), province dummies. The table reports the coefficient on the interaction between having an age eligible child and a post year 
dummy, in a specification which controls for household income, post year dummy, and having an age eligible child.
Table 5: Modified Difference in Difference Estimates
DID
2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2002-2008 2005/2006 2006/2007 2005-2008
Age Limit Change 7 to 9 9 to 11 11 to 14 14 Artificial - 10 Artificial - 10 Artificial - 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Entire Sample
Labour Force Participant 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.00
(Broad) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
-0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04
Conditional on Participation (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Employed 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
11,443 10,516 10,301 7,766 11,403 10,861 4,203
Bottom 50th percentile of Household Income
Labour Force Participant 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
(Broad) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02
Conditional on Participation (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Employed 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
11,443 10,516 10,301 7,766 11,403 10,861 4,203
Placebo Regressions
Years
Age of Youngest Child Ages 7-10 Ages 9-12 Ages 11-15 Ages 11-15 Ages 9-11 Ages 9-11 Ages 9-11
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
In this table we compare the effect of grant eligibility for those who were not eligible, and for those who suddenly become eligible, by 
dint of the age eligibility cutoff changing from year to year. The sample includes black mothers aged 20 to 45 who have at least one 
child. The table reports the coefficient on having an age eligible child in a specification which controls for household income. Standard 
Errors are reported in parentheses. The specification includes age, years of education, a marital status dummy, household income 
(based on salaries and pensions), province dummies. Clustering by PSU barely changes the standard errors, leaving the significance of 
the results the same.
Group: Full Sample Matric No Matric Married Not Married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A:
Labour Force Participant 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00
(Broad) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
-0.08 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08
Conditional on Participation (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Employed 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
10,516 10,516 10,516 10,516 10,516 10,516 10,516
Panel B:
Group: 20s 30s 40s White
Labour Force Participant 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.08
(Broad) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
-0.10 -0.08 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02
Conditional on Participation (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Employed 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.09
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
10,516 10,516 10,516 10,516 10,516 1,219
Table 6: Modified Difference in Difference Estimates, Heterogenous Treatment Effects
Bottom 50th Top 50th
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
Pensioner No Pensioner
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
This table replicates table 5, column 2, for different groups. The sample includes black mothers aged 20 to 45 who have at least one 
child. The table reports the coefficient on having an age eligible child in a specification which controls for household income. 
Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. The specification includes age, years of education, a marital status dummy, household 
income (based on salaries and pensions), province dummies. Clustering by PSU barely changes the standard errors, leaving the 
significance of the results the same.
Full Sample
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Age Limit 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Plus Minus 1
Labour Force Participant - Broad 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.06 -0.06 0.20 0.13 0.08
(0.17) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.24) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09)
-0.27 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.30 -0.01 0.27 0.15
Conditional on Participation (0.24) (0.12) (0.20) (0.10) (0.28) (0.12) (0.22) (0.11)
Employed 0.20 -0.07 -0.11 -0.02 -0.08 0.08 -0.11 -0.04
(0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.09) (0.22) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09)
421 455 383 1,259 199 246 192 637
Plus Minus 2
Labour Force Participant - Broad 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.06
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06)
0.04 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.32 0.15
Conditional on Participation (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06)
Employed -0.03 0.00 -0.19 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.19 -0.06
(0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05)
814 855 787 2,456 384 451 374 1,209
Table 7: Instrumental Variables Estimates: CSG receipt instrumented for by Eligibility.
Bottom 50 Percentiles of Income
Pooled Pooled
Unemployment - Broad
Number of Observations
Unemployment - Broad
Number of Observations
In this table we instrument for grant receipt using eligibility. The sample includes black mothers aged 20 to 45. The table reports the 
coefficient on individual grant receipt, instrumented for by having an age eligible child. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. The 
specification includes age, years of education, a marital status dummy, household income (based on salaries and pensions), province 
dummies. Clustering by PSU does not change the results significantly. The pooled sample includes years 2006, 2007, 2008.
# ChildrenSample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Birth History 12,702 2.19 0.63 2551.2 5.95
12,888 2.20 0.63 2549.3 5.96
Birth History 9,569 2.24 0.66 1683.8 6.26
9,725 2.25 0.65 1685.6 6.27
Birth History 8,047 2.26 0.99 2297.1 6.23
8,139 2.27 1.00 2294.1 6.25
Birth History 6,282 2.32 0.99 1580.5 6.52
6,358 2.33 1.00 1579.9 6.53
Birth History 2,162 2.94 0.76 1659.0 6.71
2,188 2.95 0.76 1662.1 6.72
Birth History 3,922 2.82 0.74 1666.4 6.64
3,968 2.83 0.74 1676.6 6.65
Plus Minus 1 Sample Birth History 1,148 2.37 0.55 1886.7 6.18
1,165 2.38 0.55 1893.2 6.19
Plus Minus 2 Sample Birth History 2,347 2.37 0.57 1811.7 6.24
2,381 2.37 0.57 1829.4 6.25
Appendix Table 1: Comparison between 2 methods: GHS 2002
# Obs
Has an 
Eligible Child
Household 
Income
Household 
Size
Mothers
Mother Pcode
Full Sample (Black Mothers)
Mother Pcode
Mothers with Eligible Child
Mother Pcode
Black Mothers with Eligible Child
Mother Pcode
Black Mothers with Eligible Child within 
1 year of cutoff Mother Pcode
Black Mothers with Eligible Child within 
2 years of cutoff Mother Pcode
Mother Pcode
Mother Pcode
All individuals are aged 20 to 45. Figures are unweighted, although weighted figures are very similar. Hypothesis tests show some significant 
differences, but most differences are very small. Plus Minus 2 Household income is significantly different, as a result of imputed pension income 
which is calculated in 2002 based on the numbers of pensioners present in the household, as individual grant receipt was not recorded in this 
year.
Appendix Table 2: Child Support Grant Receipt
All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Year Household CSG Receipt
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1998 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2002 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.18
2003 0.20 0.31 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.34 0.35 0.15 0.19
2004 0.28 0.44 0.52 0.51 0.59 0.47 0.48 0.25 0.29
2005 0.36 0.53 0.61 0.57 0.65 0.56 0.55 0.27 0.27
2006 0.36 0.54 0.62 0.58 0.67 0.57 0.58 0.30 0.36
2007 0.40 0.59 0.68 0.64 0.72 0.64 0.65 0.45 0.47
2008 0.42 0.61 0.69 0.66 0.74 0.67 0.66 0.45 0.48
Individual CSG Receipt
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1998 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2003 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.42 0.28 0.30 0.06 0.11
2004 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.47 0.54 0.39 0.41 0.09 0.15
2005 0.46 0.46 0.54 0.52 0.59 0.49 0.48 0.05 0.07
2006 0.48 0.48 0.56 0.54 0.62 0.52 0.53 0.16 0.22
2007 0.53 0.53 0.61 0.60 0.67 0.59 0.59 0.31 0.33
2008 0.55 0.55 0.63 0.62 0.70 0.62 0.61 0.31 0.35
Mothers
Black 
Mothers
Mothers 
with 
Eligible 
Child
Black 
Mothers 
Eligible 
Child
Black 
Mothers     
 +- 1
Black 
Mothers     
  +- 2
Plus Minus 
1   Sample
Plus Minus 
2   Sample
All individuals in these samples are aged 20 to 45. Observations from 1997 and 1998 come from the October Household 
Survey, and from the General Household Survey for years 2002- 2008. For 2002, 23% of Mothers with Eligible Children 
lived in households which reported receiving the child support grant. These means are unweighted, however weighted 
means do not differ greatly at all.
Appendix Table 3: Balancing Tests
Full Sample Plus Minus 1 Plus Minus 2
Control Control Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 38.02 -6.71 35.87 -0.71 36.06 -1.43
(0.10) -55.46 (0.33) -1.72 (0.21) -5.27
7.79 0.88 8.42 -0.23 8.18 0.26
(0.10) 9.32 (0.23) -0.77 (0.16) 1.33
Married 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.04 0.49 0.00
(0.01) 0.48 (0.03) 1.29 (0.02) 0.01
Household Size 5.77 0.84 6.34 -0.31 6.18 0.08
(0.07) 11.41 (0.16) -1.63 (0.12) 0.57
2.16 0.51 2.61 0.08 2.52 0.14
(0.03) 15.97 (0.08) 0.70 (0.05) 2.06
Household Income 1,440.1 -202.8 1,488.4 -255.3 1,411.8 -86.3
(46.36) -4.52 (117.50) -1.83 (76.76) -0.86
Labour Force Participant 0.73 -0.10 0.73 -0.02 0.70 -0.01
Broad (0.01) -10.37 (0.02) -0.69 (0.02) -0.47
0.43 0.17 0.50 0.01 0.51 -0.01
Conditional on Participation (0.01) 12.86 (0.03) 0.28 (0.02) -0.50
Employed 0.41 -0.16 0.37 -0.02 0.34 0.00
(0.01) -15.37 (0.03) -0.56 (0.02) 0.22
# Treatment Group 9,510 467 1,088
# Control Group 2,712 400 789
12,222 867 1,877
T-C Diff T-C Diff T-C Diff
Years Education
Number of Kids
Unemployment - Broad
Number of Observations
The sample includes black women aged between 20 and 45. Balancing tests are performed in the 
year 1997, pre-treatment. Eligibility is based on the 2003 criterion, that is, a child under 9.  The T 
statistic is reported below the Treatment Control Difference.  Robust Standard Errors are reported 
in parentheses. Clustering is performed at the psu level.  Estimates are unweighted, however 
weighted estimated do not differ greatly in size or significance to the figures reported here.
Appendix Table 4: Individual Child Support Grant Receipt, by Age
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Age Limit 9 11 14 14 14 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age Groups
0 0.15 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.44
1 0.38 0.49 0.54 0.57 0.64 0.66
2 0.42 0.55 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.71
3 0.43 0.57 0.64 0.63 0.68 0.70
4 0.41 0.57 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.69
5 0.45 0.57 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.69
6 0.34 0.54 0.63 0.61 0.67 0.68
7 0.23 0.50 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.68
8 0.07 0.42 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.66
9 0.02 0.28 0.52 0.57 0.61 0.65
10 0.01 0.10 0.42 0.51 0.59 0.63
11 0.01 0.04 0.27 0.46 0.56 0.58
12 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.37 0.50 0.54
13 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.28 0.38 0.47
14 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.16
15 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
This table shows the age distribution of recipients of the child support grant by year. We 
can see the sharp fall in receipt at each age limit.
Year 1997 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Age Limit 7 7 7 9 11 14 14 14 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Age Eligibility
Western Cape 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.73 0.79 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.78
Eastern Cape 0.73 0.70 0.66 0.76 0.84 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.81
Northern Cape 0.67 0.61 0.59 0.74 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.79
Free State 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.70 0.76 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.77
KwaZulu-Natal 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.72 0.81 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.81
North West 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.79
Gauteng 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.69 0.76 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.75
Mpumalanga 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.80
Limpopo 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.78 0.85 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.83
12,222 7,749 9,725 9,261 9,159 10,349 9,752 10,276 9,277 10,232
Panel B: Household CSG Receipt
Western Cape 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.44 0.52 0.46 0.47 0.55 0.55 0.47
Eastern Cape 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.39 0.48 0.65 0.69 0.74 0.77 0.56
Northern Cape 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.30 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.54 0.72 0.49
Free State 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.39 0.53 0.63 0.59 0.67 0.70 0.53
KwaZulu-Natal 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.33 0.48 0.64 0.64 0.72 0.73 0.56
North West 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.36 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.73 0.70 0.54
Gauteng 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.26 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.53 0.37
Mpumalanga 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.43 0.59 0.65 0.67 0.72 0.73 0.58
Limpopo 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.47 0.64 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.73 0.58
12,222 7,749 9,725 9,261 9,159 10,349 9,752 10,276 9,277 10,232
Appendix Table 5: Child Support Grant Takeup by Province
All Years
Number of Observations
Number of Observations
The sample includes black mothers aged 20 to 45 with at least one child - the full sample referred to in table 1.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Age Limit 9 11 14 14 14 14 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Plus Minus 2 Sample
0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
-0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
1,709 1,244 846 814 855 787 6,255
Full Sample
-0.09 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.12 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05
In Daycare (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
9,204 9,109 10,288 9,716 10,220 9,190 57,727
Appendix Table 6: Mechanisms – The effect of Individual Child Support Grant Receipt on 3 Outcomes
Pooled
Number of Kids
Attending School
Number of Kids not Attending
Due to Lack of School Fees
Number of Observations
Number of Kids Aged 7 to 15
Attending School
Number of Kids not Attending
Due to Lack of School Fees
Number of Kids Under 7
Number of Observations
The sample includes black mothers aged 20 to 45 whose youngest child is aged within 2 years of the age eligibility 
cutoff. The table reports the coefficient on having an age eligible child in a specification which controls for household 
income, or the coefficient on individual report of grant receipt. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. The 
specification includes age, years of education, a marital status dummy, household income (based on salaries and 
pensions), province dummies, number of children, and number of children aged under 7. Clustering by PSU does not 
change the results significantly. The pooled sample includes years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Age Limit 7 9 11 14 14 14 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age -1.63 -1.05 -1.25 -0.98 -0.72 -0.57 -0.89
-6.22 -3.71 -3.93 -2.91 -2.44 -1.57 -2.49
0.01 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.33 -0.41 -0.15
0.08 0.64 0.98 0.87 0.94 -1.48 -0.53
Married 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.01
-0.08 0.38 -0.42 -1.58 1.34 0.28 -0.16
Household Size 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.45 0.00
1.04 0.83 1.33 1.24 0.96 2.52 0.02
0.08 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.18
1.40 1.71 1.82 3.25 2.95 3.05 2.33
Household Income -155.65 -165.44 -10.25 268.19 200.32 -845.17 -283.99
-1.02 -1.04 -0.04 1.03 0.95 -2.25 -0.78
Labour Force Participant -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(Broad) -1.85 0.54 0.82 1.81 0.38 0.65 -0.28
0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.11
Conditional on Participation 3.04 0.00 0.21 0.32 0.80 2.09 2.69
Employed -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09
-3.48 0.20 0.13 0.61 -0.68 -1.42 -2.50
# Treatment Group 1,360 965 704 508 481 501 458
# Control Group 1,021 753 551 345 339 361 336
2,381 1,718 1,255 853 820 862 794
Appendix Table 7: Balancing Characteristics Across the Age Limits, by Year
Years Education
Number of Kids
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
This table reports the difference coefficient between treated and control, in each year, for the plus minus 2 sample. T statistics 
on this difference are reported in italics below the difference coefficient. We can see for instance in 2002, woman who had an 
eligible child were on average 1.75 years younger than women who did not, and this difference is significant.
Aged under 11:  2004
Control Control Control Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 34.24 -0.89 35.87 -0.71 37.09 -0.83 38.75 -0.87
(0.25) -2.80 (0.33) -1.72 (0.33) -1.91 (0.34) -1.79
8.63 -0.06 8.42 -0.23 8.36 -0.42 7.46 0.31
(0.17) -0.29 (0.23) -0.77 (0.27) -1.21 (0.30) 0.73
Married 0.47 0.01 0.49 0.04 0.48 0.03 0.47 0.02
(0.02) 0.55 (0.03) 1.29 (0.03) 0.67 (0.04) 0.52
Household Size 6.43 -0.12 6.34 -0.31 6.54 -0.53 5.78 0.02
(0.12) -0.83 (0.16) -1.63 (0.20) -2.09 (0.24) 0.06
2.65 -0.09 2.61 0.08 2.39 0.04 2.24 0.00
(0.06) -1.03 (0.08) 0.70 (0.08) 0.41 (0.10) 0.00
Household Income 1,395.0 -30.1 1,488.4 -255.3 1,554.7 -221.7 1,624.8 -188.2
(95.02) -0.29 (117.50) -1.83 (141.01) -1.32 (178.58) -0.86
0.69 0.00 0.73 -0.02 0.76 -0.07 0.74 -0.01
(0.02) 0.12 (0.02) -0.69 (0.03) -2.16 (0.03) -0.21
0.49 0.02 0.50 0.01 0.47 0.06 0.42 -0.07
(0.03) 0.70 (0.03) 0.28 (0.03) 1.26 (0.04) -1.20
Employed 0.35 -0.01 0.37 -0.02 0.40 -0.08 0.43 0.05
(0.02) -0.56 (0.03) -0.56 (0.03) -2.16 (0.04) 0.94
# Treatment Group 1,609 1,088 789 491
# Control Group 1,088 789 564 349
2,697 1,877 1,353 840
Appendix Table 8: Balancing Tests across the Age Ranges
Aged under 7:       
pre 2002
Aged under 9:     
2003
Aged under 14:   
2005 - 2008
T-C Diff T-C Diff T-C Diff T-C Diff
Years Education
Number of Kids
Labour Force Participant 
(Broad Definition)
Unemployed (Broad 
Definition)
Number of Observations
Balancing tests are performed in the year 1997, pre-treatment. Each sample consists of black mothers, aged 20 to 45, whose youngest 
child is aged within 2 years of the age eligibility cutoff. The T statistic is reported below the Treatment Control Difference.  Robust 
Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Clustering is performed at the psu level.
Placebo Treatment
1997 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Age Limit 0 7 9 11 14 14 14 14 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Plus Minus 2 Sample
Labour Force Participant 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02
(Broad) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
-0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.03
Conditional on Participation (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Employed 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
1,873 2,368 1,710 1,246 846 815 858 789 3,308
Full Sample
Labour Force Participant -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04
(Broad) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.07
Conditional on Participation (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Employed -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
12,198 9,683 9,211 9,114 10,301 9,730 10,249 9,233 39,513
Appendix Table 9: Labour Market Outcomes - Level Estimates of the Age Eligibility Effect
Pooled
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
The sample includes black mothers aged 20 to 45. The table reports the coefficient on having an age eligible child in a specification 
which controls for household income, or the coefficient on individual report of grant receipt. Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. 
The specification includes age, years of education, a marital status dummy, household income (based on salaries and pensions), province 
dummies. Clustering by PSU does not change the results significantly. The pooled sample includes years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.
1997 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Age 32.79 32.47 32.70 33.05 33.04 32.70 32.91 32.83 32.67
(7.08) (7.06) (7.10) (7.17) (7.24) (7.23) (7.23) (7.28) (7.35)
8.47 8.59 8.66 8.82 9.00 8.61 8.70 8.91 9.29
(4.12) (4.16) (3.86) (3.85) (3.73) (3.82) (3.79) (3.71) (3.54)
Married 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.44
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Household Size 6.42 6.29 6.27 6.06 6.01 5.99 5.77 5.89 5.84
(3.07) (3.03) (3.10) (2.87) (2.91) (2.85) (2.69) (2.79) (2.81)
2.56 2.41 2.25 2.27 2.21 2.20 2.19 2.17 2.10
(1.60) (1.51) (1.45) (1.45) (1.41) (1.40) (1.39) (1.35) (1.29)
Household Income 1,282.4 1,442.5 1,685.6 1,839.3 2,032.7 1,847.0 1,997.3 2,335.5 2,948.3
(1974.9) (3501.2) (3078.6) (3336.7) (4443.4) (3501.8) (4065.3) (4447.5) (13454.2)
Labour Force Participant 0.65 0.68 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.78
(Broad) (0.48) (0.47) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
0.56 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.56
Conditional on Participation (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Employed 0.28 0.30 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.35
(0.45) (0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.48)
# Treatment Group 8,422 5,283 6,358 6,814 7,410 9,359 8,760 9,263 8,286
# Control Group 3,800 2,466 3,367 2,447 1,749 990 992 1,013 991
12,222 7,749 9,725 9,261 9,159 10,349 9,752 10,276 9,277
Appendix Table 10: Sample Means
Years Education
Number of Kids
Unemployed (Broad)
Number of Observations
The sample includes black women aged between 20 and 45. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Date Foster Care State Maintenance
93/09 - 94/09 R 370 R 260 R115 
94/10 - 95/06 R 390 R 274 R121 
95/07 - 96/05 R 410 R 288 R127 
96/06 - 97/06 R 430 R 305 R135 
97/07 - 98/06 R 470 R 340
98/07 - 98/09 R 490 R 350 CSG CSG
98/10 - 99/06 R 500 R 360 R 100 7
1 July 1999 R 520 R 374 R 100 7
1 July 2000 R 540 R 390 R 100 7
1 July 2001 R 570 R 410 R 110 7
1 April 2002 R 620 R 450 R 130 7
1 October 2002 R 640 R 460 R 140 7
1 April 2003 R 700 R 500 R 160 9
1 April 2004 R 740 R 530 R 170 11
1 April 2005 R 780 R 560 R 180 14
1 April 2006 R 820 R 590 R 190 14
1 April 2007 R 870 R 620 R 200 14
1 April 2008 R 940 R 630 R 210 14
22 August 2008 R 960 R 650 R 230 14
1 April 2009 R 1,010 R 680 R 240 15
1 April 2010 R 1,080 R 710 R 250 16
Appendix Table 11: Grant Amounts, Adjustment Dates, and Age Limits
Old Age & Disabilty Grant Age Limits
